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Human Rights Norm Diffusion in Southeast Asia:
Roles of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in 
Ending Extrajudicial Killings in the Philippines
 Abstract
Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have played an increasingly vocal role in their 
struggle to advance both human rights protection and promotion in Southeast Asian 
countries. Most notably, CSOs have become a more important actor in dealing 
with human rights issues in particular by virtue of their role in drawing attention to 
human rights violations. In the case of massive human rights violations happening 
in Southeast Asia, CSOs pursue various strategies to address and try to end such 
abuses. Spreading information of human rights violations occurring in each 
member state to regional peers, and then finding new allies such as international 
organizations to put pressure back to human rights-violating states, in what is 
characterized as a dynamic of the boomerang model, one of the prominent strategies 
CSOs use to relieve human rights violations. Another strategy recently observed 
involves CSOs reaching out to powerful judicial institutions whose decisions can 
be legally binding on a violating state. This paper applies the boomerang model 
theory to the efforts of CSOs, specifically with respect to their work in helping to 
end the extrajudicial killing of drug dealers in the Philippines during President 
Duterte’s tenure, to display how the dynamics of the boomerang model works and 
what this strategy has achieved in terms of ending the extrajudicial killings. Beyond 
the boomerang model, this paper further demonstrates the strategy of CSOs in 
reaching out directly to powerful judicial institutions, in this case the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). The paper discusses why CSOs pursued this strategy of 
reaching out to the ICC, bypassing the region’s human rights institution—the 





Civil Society Organizations (CSOs); Extrajudicial Killing in the Philippines; the 
International Criminal Court (ICC).
1. Introduction
In Southeast Asia, civil society organizations (CSOs) across the region have for over 
a decade, been challenging the regional organization, the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), to address issues and concerns impacting citizens.1  In 
December 1997, ASEAN officially widened its policy-making to include CSOs.2 
Additionally, the Bali Concord II 2003 and the Vientiane Action Program 2004 
restated commitments regarding civil society engagement with ASEAN.3  The idea 
of collaborating with CSOs became a consistent part of the ASEAN rhetoric and 
was reaffirmed in article 1(13) of the ASEAN Charter 2007.4 At present, there are 
many CSOs working on different interests and issues in this region. The exact 
number of CSOs seems difficult to pinpoint as some of them exist only in name 
while in reality they may not be reachable, and some have merged with other CSOs.5
 According to the 2016 USAID CSO Sustainability Index for Asia, the 
Philippines has 279,499 registered CSOs—the highest number in the region. 
Indonesia, Thailand, and Cambodia have about 250,000; 14,000; and 5,000 
respectively.6  Despite this high number, it is surprising that only 52 CSOs have 
1 Anders Uhlin, Civil Society and Regional Governance: The Asian Development Bank and 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (London, Lexington Books 2017), p. 40-43. See also, 
Eduardo C. Tadem (2017), “New Perspectives on Civil Society Engagement with ASEAN”, The 
Heinrich Böll Stiftung, available at https://th.boell.org/en/2017/07/12/new-perspectives-civil-
society-engagement-asean.  (Accessed May 24, 2018).
2 The ASEAN Secretariat, 1997, “ASEAN Vision 2020”, available at http://asean.org/?static_
post=asean-vision-2020. (Accessed May 24, 2018).
3 The ASEAN Secretariat, 2003, “Declaration of ASEAN Concorde II 2003”, available at http://
asean.org/search/Bali+Concord and The ASEAN Secretariat (2004), “Vientiane Action Programme 
2004”, available at http://asean.org/storage/images/archive/VAP-10th%20ASEAN%20Summit.
pdf. (Accessed May 24, 2018).
4 The ASEAN Secretariat (2007), “ASEAN Charter 2007”, available at http://asean.org/asean/
asean-charter/.(Accessed May 24, 2018).
5 The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) (2011), “An ASEAN Community for All: Exploring the 
Scope for Civil Society Engagement”,  Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Office for Regional Cooperation 
in Asia, Singapore, p.12
6 United States Agency for International Development, ‘The 2016 CSO Sustainability Index 
for Asia’. Available at: https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/2016-Asia-
CSOSI-Report-v4-508.pdf. (Accessed 24 May, 2018). 
been accredited by ASEAN. The accreditation is officially regulated by the 
Guidelines on Accreditation of Civil Society Organizations. The first Guidelines 
were adopted at the 5th Meeting of the 19th ASEAN Standing Committee (ASC), 
Manila, 16-18 June 1986, and the current version was adopted by the 19/2012 the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives (CPR) Meeting on 5th November 2012 
and noted by the 11th the ASEAN Coordinating Council (ACC) Meeting on 17th 
November 2012.7 
 With respect to CSOs in the human rights field, a number of CSOs have 
emerged to be a facilitator on matters of human rights when the Working Group 
for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism (Working Group) was created in 1995, 
because the Working Group consisted of parliamentary human rights committees, 
the academic community, and CSOs.8 Official statements of the Working Group 
show that several CSOs such as MARUAH Singapore, the Philippine Alliance of 
Human Rights Advocates (PAHRA), the Asia Foundation, and Friedrich Naumann 
Stiftung have often participated in Workshops and Roundtable Discussions of the 
Working Group.9  The primary purpose of the Working Group was to establish 
an intergovernmental human rights commission for this region which finally 
came to be called the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights 
(AICHR).10  It can thus be said that CSOs have been involved in the regionalization 
process of human rights by being part of the creation of ASEAN’s regional human 
rights institution—the AICHR.
 
7 The ASEAN Secretariat (2015), “Register of Accredited Civil Society Organizations (CSOs): 
Listed as Entities Associated with ASEAN, in Annex 2 of the ASEAN Charter”, available at http://
www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Accredited-Civil-Society-Organisations-as-of-25-
May-2016.pdf.(Accessed May 24, 2018).
8 The Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism (the Working Group) (2007), 
“The initiative for an intergovernmental human rights commission for Southeast Asia”, available 
at http://www.aseanhrmech.org/aboutus.html, (Accessed May 24, 2018).
9 The Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism (the Working Group) 
(2001-2009), “The 1st- 8th Workshop for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism and the 1st-5th 
Roundtable Discussion on Human Rights in ASEAN”, available at http://www.aseanhrmech.org/
conferences/index.html. (Accessed May 24, 2018).
10 Helen E. S. Nesadurai, Transnational Civil Society, the Market and Governance Reform in 
Southeast Asia in Alice D. Ba and Mark Beeson (eds), Contemporary Southeast Asia: The Politics 
of Change, Contestation, and   Adaptation (3rd edition, Palgrave 2018), p. 204-206. See also, Hao 
Duy Phan, A Selective Approach to Establishing a Human Rights Mechanism in Southeast Asia: 




 The CSO-ASEAN interconnection had changed however, over the few years 
after the AICHR was established—civil society had been limited in involvement 
with the AICHR.11  For instance, in the process of drafting the ASEAN Human 
Rights Declaration (AHRD), CSOs had been invited only twice to the formal 
consultation on the AHRD.12  Moreover, the AICHR did not release the working 
draft of the declaration, and ASEAN foreign ministers released only ‘key elements’ 
of the draft whereas the full draft was kept confidential, thereby precluding any 
direct input from CSOs via formal engagement, despite the drafting process being 
the most important step forward in human rights at the time.13 Nevertheless, 
things are looking brighter, CSOs have become increasingly recognized. The 
AICHR seems to have sought for more meaningful and constructive engagement 
and interaction with CSOs through the adoption of Guidelines on the AICHR’s 
Relations with Civil Society Organisations in 2015.14  The guidelines are aimed to 
further strengthen ASEAN cooperation in the promotion and protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. 
 In reality, especially in human rights violations occurring in Southeast Asia, 
there has been an ongoing tension between civil society and national governments 
and/or the AICHR.15  When CSOs play a role in upholding people’s rights, but in 
so doing, challenge the government, CSOs have been often ignored and deemed 
immaterial by the AICHR, and seem oppressed by some governments.16
 A recent example can be found in the Philippines where president Rodrigo 
Duterte commissioned a campaign against drugs which has resulted in 6,000 
11 James Gomez and Robin Ramcharan (2012), “The Protection of Human Rights in Southeast 
Asia: Improving the Effectiveness of Civil Society”, Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the 
Law, Vol. 12, Issue 2, p.  27-43.
12 The AICHR (2017), The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) 
Annual Report 2017, p. 12.
13 James Gomez and Robin Ramcharan (2012) in supra note 11, p. 28. See also Mathew 
Davies (2017), Important but De-centred: ASEAN’s Role in the Southeast Asian Human Rights 
Space, TRaNS: Trans-Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia, volume 5, special issue 
1(ASEAN Communities), p. 106.
14 The AICHR (2015), “Meaningful and constructive engagement and interaction between 
AICHR and CSOs”, available at http://aichr.org/news/meaningful-and-constructive-engagement-
and-interaction-between-aichr-and-csos/, (Accessed May 24, 2018).
15 Shveta Dhaliwal, Human Rights Mechanism in Southeast Asia (Oxon, Routledge 2017).
16 Gomez, James, and Robin Ramcharan (2014), Evaluating Competing “Democratic” 
Discourses: The Impact on Human Rights Protection in Southeast Asia, in: Journal of Current 
Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol.33, No.3, p. 49–77.
people—alleged drug peddlers and users—being killed (as of 15 February 2017) in 
what is infamously known as Duterte’s war on drugs.17  CSOs have acted in various 
ways, such as mobilization and other actions, in response to these extrajudicial 
killings. Surprisingly, the president responded aggressively by remarking “I will kill 
human rights advocates if the campaign against drugs is stopped because of them”.18
 With an interest in the manner and consequences of CSO mobilization in the 
field of human rights, this paper examines CSOs’ works with respect to their help 
in mitigating human rights abuses involved in the war on drugs in the Philippines 
under president Duterte’s regime. The paper starts off by providing a theoretical 
context on the definition and role of CSOs along with their place in the dynamics of 
human rights norm diffusion, pursuant to Keck and Sikkink’s boomerang model.19 
The application of this theoretical context to CSOs’ role in the Philippines’ war on 
drug can be found in the analysis, which will be divided into three parts. 
 The first part provides a brief background into the war on drugs in the 
Philippines under president Duterte’s tenure. The second part is an application 
of Keck and Sikkink’s theoretical framework of the boomerang model with the 
Philippines’ case. We further evaluate what the impact has been on the Philippines, 
the norm-violating state after CSOs carried out their role as agents of human rights 
norm diffusion. In the third part, we further examine a coalition of CSOs and their 
strategy in reaching out to a powerful international institution; the ICC, to bring 
human rights violations in the extrajudicial killing case into the international legal 
process. We argue why the ICC is a feasible arena for CSOs to pursue their claims, 
and submit that CSOs’ recourse to the ICC is necessitated by ASEAN’s lack of a 
powerful regional human rights institution to deal with human rights violations. 
The result of CSOs’ strategies will be the lesson for ASEAN to accelerate its 
consideration in establishing this kind of human rights mechanism soon because it 
would be effective to stop human rights violation in the region.
17 Jodesz Gavilan (2016), “Duterte’s War on Drugs: The First 6 Months”, available at https://
www.rappler.com/newsbreak/rich-media/rodrigo-duterte-war-on-drugs-2016. (Accessed May 24, 
2018).
18 CIVICUS (2016), “Drug war unsettles civil society in Philippines”, available at https://www.
civicus.org/index.php/media-resources/news/interviews/2676-drugs-war-unsettles-civil-society-
in-philippines, (Accessed May 24, 2018).






In other regions in the world, such as in the Americas, CSOs have joined efforts 
to propel human rights promotion and protection. Their engagement with 
institutions is clearly welcomed, both in national and regional platforms.20 In 
ASEAN, however, the need for CSO engagement has not been awarded priority. 
The significance of this research therefore lies in the fact that it underscores 
CSO co-operation as a promising agent of developing human rights protection 
in Southeast Asia. This paper also adds to the discussion on human rights norm 
diffusion. It should be noted that the human rights norm in focus here is the 
norm on human rights protection and ending human rights violations diffused by 
CSOs. As we examine CSOs engagement in the region, specifically how CSOs 
diffuse human rights information in response to human rights violations from the 
domestic to the regional level to demand for human rights protection, the research 
contributes in building up ASEAN’s awareness on the role of CSO working not 
only at the domestic level but also at the regional level. Finally, with respect to the 
international level, the study on CSOs’ international strategies will be beneficial 
towards ascertaining how their future work could contribute to the improvement 
of the ASEAN human rights protection system.
3. Research Methodology
The methodology this paper adopts follows a qualitative approach. First, relying 
on both primary and secondary sources of data, the paper identifies and analyzes 
the recent performances of CSOs in Southeast Asia. Discussions, events, and 
released statements organized by CSOs, and having a personal interview with 
director and president of CSOs in the region will be analyzed to determine their 
impact on the Philippines, and ascertain whether or not they are effective to help 
diminish human rights violations with respect to the extrajudicial killing case under 
President Duterte’s regime. Some of the information presented in the analysis part 
were obtained by virtue of attendance in an official AICHR meeting, in which 
20 Stefanie Khoury and David Whyte, Corporate Human Rights Violations: Global Prospects 
for Legal Action (Routledge 2017). See also, Heidi Nichols Haddad (2012), ‘Judicial Institution 
Builders: NGOs and International Human Rights Courts’, 11 Journal of Human Rights, p. 140.
an author was able to pose questions to CSOs and the AICHR representatives.21 
Moreover, personally interviewing the AICHR representatives is another fruitful 
method employed by this research. Secondly, the paper draws on legal provision 
of the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) in making 
an analysis on why CSOs adopt an international strategy in reaching out to the 
International Criminal Court.
4. The Theoretical Context
4.1 Roles of CSOs on Human Rights Issues
First of all, it should be clarified that the term civil society organization (CSO) 
refers to a broad range of non-state, non-profit entities such as non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), charities, trusts, foundations, and advocacy groups.22 
CSOs have increasingly been playing a vital role in numerous fields for a few 
decades, and especially in human rights issue.23  Marc Nerfin describes CSOs 
as the third system functioning benignly, helping the people to assert their own 
power and making efforts to listen to those who are never or rarely heard, rather 
than seeking governmental power.24  Richard Falk describes CSOs as being actors 
which many states fear as CSOs’s power can typically at least slow the exercise 
of the formal political power of the state.25  Civil society is generally seen as 
being characterized by non-violence and, in fact, as being determinedly opposed 
to the use of violence.26  Also, CSOs are seen as linking social cleavages and as 
being instituted by horizontal networks where all members have an equal chance 
21 The AICHR High Level Dialogue on Managing Freedom of Expression in the Information 
Age. Held in Medan, Indonesia, 11 – 12 April 2018.
22 Thomas Richard Davies, NGOs: A New History of Transnational Civil Society (Oxford 
University Press 2014). See also, Bridget M. Hutter and Joan O’Mahony (2004) ‘The Role of Civil 
Society Organizations in Regulating Business’, Economic and Social Research Council Centre for 
Analysis of Risk and Regulation Discussion Paper No. 26, p.1.
23 Markus Thiel, European Civil Society and Human Rights Advocacy (University of 
Pennsylvania Press 2017).  See also, Hilary Charlesworth and Emma Larking, Human Rights and 
the Universal Periodic Review: Rituals and Ritualism (Cambridge University Press 2014).
24 Marc Nerfin (1987), “Neither Prince or Marchant: Citizen. An Introduction to the Third 
System”, A Journal of International Development Cooperation, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 
Vol. 1, p. 170-195.
25 Richard Falk, Revitalizing International Law (Iowa State Publisher 1989), p. 208-213.




to participate in decision-making.27  In terms of judicial decision making, Dinah 
Shelton has noted the increasingly important roles of NGOs in international 
courts, describing that NGOs provide legal and political analysis and practical 
information that states may be unable to marshal, thereby facilitating the decision-
making process.28 
 The political struggle for human rights is universal and potentially engages 
all human beings, a key agent who plays an influential role in the process is civil 
society organizations.29 Concern for human rights would not have achieved 
international expression without the backdrop of social and political understandings 
promoted by CSOs.30  Loveday Hodson states that global human rights culture is 
created, maintained, and developed by a myriad of actors, including individuals 
and CSOs.31  Upendra Baxi support that human rights are assembled by several 
actors acting simultaneously within the given legal and political structures, and 
challenging and changing them in the process.32  
 Kelly Gerard further notes that CSOs not only participate in spaces that 
have been established or recognized by intergovernmental organizations, but they 
can also create more spaces to pursue human rights and political activity, bypassing 
regional and state actors.33  CSOs can also create three types of activities, namely: 
parallel activities such as forums and workshops; protests; and the production 
and dissemination of critical knowledge which sometimes directly influence 
official processes of states and intergovernmental organizations.34  High-profile 
organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have raised 
27 Ibid.
28 Dinah Shelton (1994), “The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in International 
Judicial Proceedings”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 88, No. 4, p. 611-642.
29 Ibid.
30 Dianne Otto (1996), “Nongovernmental Organizations in the United Nations System: The 
Emerging Role of International Civil Society”, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 1, p. 107-141.
31 Loveday Hodson, NGOs and the Struggle for Human Rights in Europe, (Hart Publishing Ltd 
2011), p. 25.
32 Upendra Baxi, The Future of Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2008), p.32-58.
33 Kelly Gerard (2015), “Explaining ASEAN’s Engagement of Civil Society in Policymaking: 
Smoke and Mirrors”, Globalizations, Vol.12, No.3, p.365-382.
34 Kelly Gerard (2014), “ASEAN and civil society activities in ‘created spaces’: the limits of 
liberty”, The Pacific Review, Vol.27, No.2, p.265-287.
the profile of international non-state actors greatly.35  Neil Stammers has also 
commented on the capacity of national and regional CSOs and transnational networks 
pressuring and communicating the human rights concerns around the world.36
 Mary Kaldor notes that the important concept of civil society is to add 
human rights discourse and pressure political actors to take responsibility to 
respect human rights through activities of networks.37  Steve Charnovitz goes as 
far as to credit CSOs with helping to humanize modern international law.38  In 
practice, CSOs have used numerous means to promote and ensure respect for 
human rights in international platforms. As Theo van Boven notes, non-state 
actors such as NGOs possess important technical skills which make them suitable 
for being full participants and sometimes as principal actors during initial human 
rights standard-setting processes—such as the drafting of the UN human rights 
conventions and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.39  Non–state actors 
are now considered full participants in the international stage. Peter Willetts 
embraces this view, referring enthusiastically to NGOs and CSOs as partners in 
the international law-making process.40
 Other regional institutions such as the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights broadly support 
CSOs’ participations. For example, Dinah Shelton reports that the Inter-American 
Court appears never to have rejected an amicus filing, which has naturally served 
as encouragement for numerous human rights groups to submit briefs to it.41  She 
also applauds this high level of non-state actor participation because, thereby, the 
public interest is broadly served and the work of the Inter-American Commission 
is supplemented to ensure a full and fair hearing for all issues which accompany 
35 Loveday Hodson in supra note 31, p. 26.
36 Neil Srammers, Human Rights and Social Movements (Pluto Press 2009), p.248.
37 Mary Kaldor, Global Civil Society: An Answer to War (Polity Press 2003), p.86.
38 Steve Charnovitz (2006), “Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law”, 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 100, p. 361. 
39 Theo van Boven (1990) “The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in International 
Human Rights Standard-Setting: A Prerequisite of Democracy”, California Western International 
Law Journal, Vol. 20, No. 2 , Article 5, p. 218. 
40 Peter Willetts (2000), “From ‘Consultative arrangements’ to ‘Partnership’: The Changing 
Status of NGOs in Diplomacy at the UN”, Global Governance, Vol. 6, p. 191.




the cases before the court.42  The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
has relaxed rules of standing which provide that NGOs and /or CSOs may submit 
a petition to it in relation to human rights violations on behalf of others.43  Mendez 
and Vivanco further claim that sometimes CSOs act as representatives of the 
victims and legal advisers to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
in practically all the cases pending before the Court.44 
 As for the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the court is 
empowered to receive cases referred by individuals and by NGOs with observer 
status before the Court, provided that the state concerned has made a declaration 
accepting this procedure.45  Odinkalu and Christensen state that NGOs have 
been at the heart of the African Charter system, and perusal of a collection of the 
Commission’s decisions reveals that the vast majority of communications under 
that treaty originate from non-state actors.46  Abdelsalam Mohamed supports the 
important contribution of CSOs, seeing these actors as “a welcome innovation”. 
He emphasizes the imperative nature of CSOs to African human rights litigation 
by pointing that if the Court “does not open up to…CSO participation, it might be 
guilty of clinging to an outmoded view of human rights adjudication”.47 
4.2 CSO’s Strategies in Diffusing Human Rights Information
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink assert the importance of transnational 
advocacy networks for the diffusion of international norms in human rights issues.48 
In their view, advocacy networks are significant transnationally and domestically 
42 Ibid, p. 640.
43 Loveday Hodson in supra note 31, p. 31. See also, Article 44, American Convention on 
Human Rights 1969
44 Juan E Mendez and Jose Miguel Vivanco (1990), “Disappearances and Inter-American Court: 
Reflections on a Litigation Experience”, Hamline Law Review, Vol. 13, p. 507
45 Loveday Hodson in supra note 31, p.32.
46 Chidi Anselm Odinkalu and Camilla Christensen (1998), “The African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights: the Development of its Non-State Communication Procedures”, 
Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 20, p. 235. See also, Article 55, African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights 1981.
47 Abdelsalam A. Mohamed (1999), “Individual and Ngo participation in Human Rights 
Litigation before the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Lessons from the European and 
Inter-American Courts of Human Rights”, Journal of African Law, Vol. 43, Issue.2, p. 201-213.
48 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders (Cornell University Press 
1998), p. 1.
for building new links among actors in civil societies, states, and international 
organizations, they multiply the channels of access to the international system.49 
CSOs play a central role as major actors in advocacy networks, usually initiating 
actions and pressuring more powerful actors to take position, and also introduce 
new ideas, provide information, and lobby for policy changes over human rights 
issues.50 Martha Finnemore remarks that transnational advocacy networks are 
proliferating, and their goal is to change the behavior of states and of international 
organizations by bringing new ideas, norms, and discourses into policy debates, 
and serve as sources of information and testimony.51
 CSOs have a variety of strategies which they may pursue depending on their 
evaluation of their policy. They may, for example, pursue public visibility, form 
domestic coalitions, engage in governmental lobbying or confrontation, or attempt 
transnational networking to reach out regionally or internationally.52  Nationally, 
a CSO may choose to reach out directly to the public, to raise its concerns with 
the general public to either elicit an immediate response, such as support in 
a referendum, upcoming election or parliamentary bill, or to attempt longer 
term processes of awareness raising, education, and norm diffusion.53 A CSO may 
choose to reach out to other sympathetic CSO organizations, or to build alliances 
with other economic and political groups like labor unions, business organizations, 
or political parties.54  A human rights CSO may also choose to reach out to national 
human rights institutions (NHRIs) which exist in many countries, in an attempt 
to find institutional allies to pursue its agenda.55  The transnational networking of 
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid, p. 9.
51 Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, (Cornell University Press 
1996), p. 2.
52 Ibid.
53 Ronald Holzhacker (2006), “Opportunity Structures and Strategies of Civil Society 
Organizations in Multi-Level Governance: The Development of Anti-Discrimination Law in 
Italy”, presentation at the European Consortium for Political Research Standing Group on EU 
Politics, Istanbul, Turkey, 21-23 September, available at http://www.jhubc.it/ecpr-istanbul/
virtualpaperroom/059.pdf. (Accessed May 24, 2018).
54 Ibid.
55  Catherine Renshaw and Kieren Fitzpatrick (2012), “National human rights institutions in 
the Asia Pacific region : change agents under conditions of uncertainty” in Ryan Goodman and 
Thomas I Pegram (eds), Human Rights, State Compliance, and Social Change: Assessing National 




human rights CSOs may be with international groups like Amnesty International 
and Human Rights Watch, or peer groups in other countries working on similar 
issues. CSOs may participate in international human rights mechanisms like the 
Universal Periodic Review Process,56  and are increasingly doing so, also in the 
Southeast Asian region.57
 Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink further describe how international 
human rights norms are socialized—internalized and domestically implemented—
to impact political transformation processes. They argue that “networks like CSOs 
among regional and domestic who manage to link up with international regimes” 
are crucial to international human rights norm diffusion as they fulfill three 
objectives which create the conditions necessary for domestic change regarding 
human rights such as a violation case.58  These three objectives are said to be 
1) putting norm-violating states on the international agenda in terms of moral-
consciousness raising; 2) mobilizing domestic opposition groups against norm-
violating states in two aspects: empowering and legitimizing the claims of the 
group, and partially protecting the groups’ physical integrity from state repression; 
and 3) challenging norm-violating states by “creating a transnational structure” 
pressuring states simultaneously from above and from below.59 
 Keck and Sikkink underscore a strategy of CSOs in the socialization 
of norms, describing that CSOs appear most likely to create channels between 
domestic groups and their governments where such channels have been blocked 
or are ineffective for resolving a conflict and human rights violations.60 They 
further suggested the “boomerang model” to illustrate the pattern and components 
of diffusion of human rights norms by positing that in the event a government 
violates or refuses to recognize rights, individuals and domestic groups, often 
having no recourse within domestic or judicial arenas yet aware that their claims 
56 Edward McMahon and Marta Ascherio (2012),  “A Step Ahead in Promoting Human Rights? 
The Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council”, Global Governance: A Review 
of Multilateralism and International Organizations, Vol. 18, No. 2, p. 231-248.
57 Catherine Renshaw and Kieren Fitzpatrick in supra note 55.
58 Thomas Risse, Stephen C Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, the Power of Human Rights: 
International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge University Press 1999), p. 5.
59 Ibid, p. 5.
60  Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink in supra note 48, p. 12.
may still resonate elsewhere, seek international connections to gain allies.61  Such 
international contacts can “amplify” the demand of domestic groups, pry open 
space for new issues, and then echo this demand back into the domestic arenas 
where their claims had once been neglected—an event which had triggered the 
seek for external pressure in the first place.62 
 This boomerang-like pattern of influence, characteristic of civil society 
organizations where the target of their activity is to change a state’s behavior, can 
commonly be found in human rights and social rights campaigns. When channels 
between the state and its domestic actors are blocked, the boomerang pattern may 
occur by the act of CSOs.63  If CSOs are also blocked domestically, they will 
seek access to the international arena, leverage, information, and resources for 
conducting campaigns and raising awareness.64 For example, the violating state 
blocks requests by and redress to CSOs within it; those CSOs will activate network 
to prompt their allies or a third-party organization to pressure the violating state.65 
Here it can be seen that the transnational aspect is particularly important in cases 
where domestic ties have been severed by the norm-violating government. It is 
crucial for activists to come together and blur the lines between domestic and 
foreign organizations, upgrading their efforts transnationally beyond borders.66
 Acharya added that local CSOs may act as agents of human rights norm 
diffusion in the following main ways: localizing foreign ideas and approaches to 
develop human rights, filling gaps by operating in areas where foreign CSOs fear to 
be treaded or banned from operating, and devising and implementing projects that 
are locally relevant and useful.67  All of these methods aim at inducing governments 
to accept a norm that they do not favour for the purposes of satisfying the demand 
of the civil society and the people represented by it.68 
61 Ibid, p. 13.
62 Ibid, p. 16-17.
63 Ibid, p. 12.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid, p. 13.
66 Ibid, p. 32.
67 Amitav Acharya (2004), “How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and 





 Nevertheless, some scholars have pointed out that the crucial component in 
the socialization of norms consists less in the agents carrying it out but it is rather 
in the rapid manner by which information is exchanged back and forth between 
highly institutionalized components of networks that is key to their success in 
advancing human rights protection. This human rights norm diffusion pattern 
observed has been aptly named the “ricochet” and entails the rapid exchange of 
ideas and legal and political arguments between various actors and institutions 
occurring transnationally.69  These actors include local CSOs, human rights NGOs, 
intergovernmental institutions, as well as foreign governments.70 
 Here the paper focuses not so much on the domestic, international, or global 
strategies, but instead on regional strategies, supporting that regional strategies 
may be especially fruitful for human rights groups to pursue. Beth Simmons in 
her landmark book “Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic 
Politics” deals with the politics of treaty commitment and the politics of compliance 
over human rights issues.71  She posits that the true power of multilateral agreements 
emerges as ‘more countries – especially regional peers – ratify human rights 
accords’ and it becomes ‘more difficult to justify non-adherence’.72 Her empirical 
research also demonstrates how CSOs working transnationally within a region can 
help spread the word of human rights violations and non-adherence by states.73 
5. Analysis on CSOs’ Roles and Strategies in the Extrajudicial 
Killing of Suspected Drug Dealers and Users in the Philippines 
under President Rodrigo Duterte’s Policy
Since theoretically we hold CSOs’ role and strategy to be key in diffusing human 
rights information, in this analysis part we first briefly provide a background on the 
69  Ronald Holzhacker (2013), “State-Sponsored Homophobia and the Denial of the Right 
of Assembly in Central and Eastern Europe: The “Boomerang” and the “Ricochet” between 
European Organizations and Civil Society to Uphold Human Rights”, Law and Policy, Vol. 35, 
Issue 1-2, p. 1-28.
70 Ibid.
71 Beth A Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics 
(Cambridge University Press 2009).
72 Ibid, p. 13.
73 Ibid.
extrajudicial killing campaign under President Duterte’s policy in the Philippines. 
Next, we analyze CSOs strategy of diffusing information on the violation by way 
of application of the boomerang model to the facts of the extrajudicial killing 
case and subsequently determine the impact that this strategy of the CSOs have 
had against the Philippines, the violating state. Finally, we discuss another CSO 
strategy which involves reaching out to an international judicial organization—the 
ICC. We analyze the legal principles of the ICC that support this international 
strategy of the CSOs and then demonstrate, in fact, how this strategy was pursued.
5.1 Background on the War on Drugs in the Philippines
Upon his taking of office on June 30, 2016, the Philippines’ President, Rodrigo 
Duterte, has pursued a “war on drugs” campaign. The campaign has led to the 
deaths of over 12,000 Filipinos to date, including many of those who were innocent, 
either as collateral damage or as cases of mistaken identity.74 Among the innocent 
killed, there was a worst case to guarantee that this campaign against illegal drugs 
is very reprehensible. Jefferson Bunuan, a 20-year-old who has been a sponsored 
child of the Kaibigan sa Ermita Outreach Foundation Inc. (KEOFI) for 11 years, 
himself a criminology student who dreamt of becoming a police officer, and 
was a volunteer of the Philippine National Police (PNP)’s “Lambat Sibat” crime 
prevention program lost his life as a result of the shootings in this campaign.75 This 
case explicitly demonstrates that the policy of Duterte constitutes an arbitrary attack 
on their civilians without any regard as to the universal standards of human rights.
 Worldwide news coverage has documented Philippines and its increasing 
number of extrajudicial and vigilante killings of drug dealers. There is global 
condemnation of the anti-drug campaign as a downright violation of human rights 
while Duterte himself continues to encourage vigilante actions by taking up arms 
to execute drug dealers or users.76 The president also denigrates the Commission 
74 Human Rights Watch (2017), “Philippines’ ‘War on Drugs’”, available at https://www.hrw.
org/tag/philippines-war-drugs. (Accessed May 24, 2018).
75 ABS-CBN News (2016), “Foundation scholar a victim of Duterte’s war on drugs?”, available 
at http://news.abs-cbn.com/focus/07/20/16/foundation-scholar-a-victim-of-dutertes-war-on-drugs. 
(Accessed May 24, 2018).




on Human Rights and other nations and institutions which have called for 
investigations of blatant human rights violations in the anti-drug campaign.77 
Amidst this, a massive CSO response also took place. Several human rights 
groups and peace groups, condemning the campaign and denouncing the actions 
of the present administration, have led their own mobilization against these 
extrajudicial killings.
5.2 CSOs’ Strategy in Diffusing Information on Violations and its Outcomes
As evident from the background of the war against drugs at hand, the norm-violating 
behavior of the state is definitely demonstrated by summary executions involved in 
the campaign of the Duterte government, which is clearly out of due process of law. It 
is also a violation of the fundamental freedoms and human rights of all as enshrined 
in the Philippines Constitution, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and all 
other international laws and legal instruments to which the Philippines Government 
is signatory to.78  This violation of human rights thus activates the boomerang model, 
which is used to characterize the pattern of practice taken against a norm-violating 
state. Its dynamics and outcomes will be demonstrated below.
5.2.1 How Did CSOs Work Within The Boomerang Dynamic on The 
Philippines Case?
A clear example of the boomerang model, as carried out by CSOs as the main agent, 
can be found in the mobilization by the Caucus of Development NGO Networks 
(CODE-NGO) and other national CSOs, as illustrated in Figure 1 below.
77 Ibid.
78 CODE-NGO (2016), “Stop Extra Judicial Killings! Uphold Human Rights!”, available at 
http://code-ngo.org/2016/10/stop-extra-judicial-killings-uphold-human-rights. (Accessed May 24, 
2018).
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Figure 1: the Boomerang Model applied to the Extrajudicial Killings in the Philippines.
 Step 1 (National strategy): State blocks requests to national CSOs who then spread information 
to regional CSOs; 
 Step 2 (Regional strategy): Regional CSOs find international allies 
 Step 3 (International strategy): International CSOs pressure international organizations.
 Step 4 (Boomerang Pressure): International organizations put pressure back to the state. 
STEP 1: National CSOs request the Philippine government to stop violations 
but the request was blocked. CODE-NGO started off by cooperating with 
the Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates (PAHRA) and Campaign 
for Human Rights in the Philippines (CHRP) to call on the Philippine National 
Police (PNP) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to uphold human rights and 
due process in the government’s campaign against illegal drugs and to urgently 
conduct full investigations into the deaths of “suspected drug personalities” during 
police operations and those done by vigilantes.79 The coalition of CODE-NGO, 
PAHRA, and CHRP further called on the House of Representatives and the Senate 
to focus their effort in aiding legislation on bringing justice to the victims of extra 





to be able to provide appropriate responses to curtail the supply and demand for 
illegal drugs, including opportunities for rehabilitation, education and livelihood 
to renewed victims of drug use and trade.80 
 Roselle Rasay, deputy director of CODE-NGO, speaking on behalf of this 
CSO network, reports that CSOs have issued statements in social media denouncing 
the extrajudicial killings being waged by the government.81  She states that CODE-
NGO passed a resolution calling on government branches ─the legislative, the 
executive and the judiciary─ to uphold human rights in this anti-drug campaign.82 
 But the mobilization of CODE-NGO, PAHRA, and CHRP have been 
blocked by President Duterte. The president remarked that police were to 
shoot people involved in human rights groups who are “obstructing justice”.83 
He remarked that he will kill all human rights organizations as he claims they 
contribute to the problem of illegal drugs.84 The president also gave a warning to 
human rights organizations that they will face criminal investigations for acting 
against his anti-drug campaign.85  Furthermore, Duterte told Philippines police to 
continue pursuing their duty with respect to the war on drugs policy by remarking 
that murder and homicide are unlawful, but police had to uphold the rule of law 
while carrying out their duties.86  Finally, he insisted that he will pursue the drug 
war to the end of his term in 2022.87 
 STEP 2: Finding regional CSOs, and spreading information to 
international CSOs. When the national CSOs’ request was blocked, they 
80 Ibid.
81 CIVICUS in supra note 18.
82 Ibid.
83 Human Rights Watch (2017), Philippines: Duterte Threatens Human Rights Community: Call 
for Police to Shoot Activists ‘Reprehensible’, available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/17/
philippines-duterte-threatens-human-rights-community. (Accessed May 24, 2018).
84 Oliver Holmes, Human rights group slams Philippines president Duterte’s threat to kill them, 
(The Guardian, 17 August 2017) Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/17/
human-rights-watch-philippines-president-duterte-threat (Accessed May 24, 2018).
85 Human Rights Watch in supra note 83. 
86 The guardian (2017), Philippines’ Duterte orders police to kill ‘idiots’ who resist arrest, 
available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/28/philippines-duterte-orders-police-
to-kill-idiots-who-resist-arrest. (Accessed May 24, 2018).
87 Philip C. Tubeza and Tonette Orejas (2017), Duterte: War on drugs to continue until 2022, 
Inquirer, available at: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/950878/rodrigo-duterte-war-on-drugs-drug-
killings-extrajudicial-killlings (Accessed May 24, 2018).
proceeded to find allies outside the country, and information was spread to CSOs 
across the region. These regional CSOs include the Indonesian Coalition for 
Drug Policy Reform (ICDPR), the Asian Harm Reduction Network (AHRN) in 
Myanmar, the Asian Network of People Who Use Drugs (ANPUD) in Thailand, 
and Human Rights Watch.88  The national and regional CSOs then cooperatively 
spread information to international CSOs.
 STEP 3: Collaboration with international CSOs to pressure 
international organizations. The collaboration of national, regional, and 
international CSOs is for the purposes of pressuring international organizations. 
Therefore, finally, 375 CSOs worldwide, led by the International Drug Policy 
Consortium (IDPC), called on the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) and the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) and sent an 
open letter89 to the UNODC Executive Director, Mr. Yury Fedotov, and the INCB 
President, Mr. Werner Sipp, asking them to take immediate action aimed at putting 
a stop to the extrajudicial killings.90 
 Ann Fordham, Executive Director of the IDPC added that the Duterte policy 
on drug cannot be justified as a “drug control measure” as he always argue it to be 
and that it is unacceptable for suspects to be killed across the Philippines, day after 
day, in silence.91  She also summaries that the open letter asks the UNODC and 
the INCB to ask the following of President Duterte as follows: (1) Immediately 
end the incitements to kill people suspected of using or dealing drugs; (2) Act 
to fulfil international human rights obligations, such as the rights to life, health, 
due process and a fair trial, as set out in the human rights treaties ratified by the 
Philippines; (3) Promote evidence-based, voluntary treatment and harm reduction 
services for people who use drugs instead of compulsory rehabilitation in military 
camps, and (4) Not to reinstate the death penalty for drug offences.92
88 International Drug Policy Consortium (2016), ‘Over 300 NGOs call on the United Nations 
to take immediate action on the hundreds of extrajudicial killings of suspected drug offenders 
in the Philippines’, available at https://idpc.net/media/press-releases/2016/08/over-300-ngos-call-
on-the-united-nations-to-take-immediate-action-on-the-hundreds-of-extrajudicial-killings-of-








 STEP 4: International organizations put pressure back to the norm-
violating state (the Philippines). In the final stage of the boomerang dynamic, 
international organizations, namely the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) and the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), took action by 
putting pressure back to the Philippines. The UNODC expresses its great concern. 
A UNODC Executive Director Statement was released. It condemns the apparent 
endorsement of extrajudicial killings, and points out the illegality of such act.93  It 
concludes by encouraging the Philippines to “bring suspected drug dealers and users 
to justice with the appropriate legal safeguards in line with international standards 
and norms, and promote prevention, treatment, rehabilitation and reintegration 
approaches based in evidence, science, public health and human rights.”94
 From applying the theory with the Filipino case, we see advocacy networks 
serving the three purposes Risse and Sikkink identify as essential in bringing about 
domestic change in human rights. First, the advocacy networks’ campaign against 
the extra-judicial killings constitutes moral-consciousness raising. In this regard, 
they have succeeded in putting the norm-violating regime of President Duterte 
on the international agenda. Second, by appealing to the national legislative and 
administrative institutions in the Philippines, they have also served to empower 
and legitimize the claims of the domestic opposition groups. Third, in garnering 
support from other CSOs and institutions, the advocacy networks against the war 
on drugs have established a transnational structure to pressure the norm-violating 
state. For the third purpose it is noted that Keck and Sikkink’s boomerang model 
is seen being applied in practice where domestic CSOs, upon failure to appeal 
directly to the norm-violating state, are seen to have sought for international allies 
to exert pressure back against the state. 
5.2.2 Impact to the Philippines as the Human Rights-Violating State after 
Information of the Violation has Globally Spread
93 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2016), the UNODC Executive Director 
Statement on the situation in the Philippines, available at https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/
press/releases/2016/August/statement-by-the-unodc-executive-director-on-the-situation-in-the-
philippines.html. (Accessed May 24, 2018).
94 Ibid.
The external pressure from the international level led by CSOs notably impacted 
the Philippines in two areas; economic, and diplomatic relationships. 
 In August 2016, the United States was the first global power to withhold 
poverty aid to the Philippines after declaring concern over Duterte’s war on 
drugs on.95 In September 2016, the relationship between Duterte and the Obama 
administration was increasingly strained as Obama scrapped a meeting with 
the controversial Philippine President Duterte.96 Later, on December 14, 2016, 
the US Embassy in Manila declared that a US government foreign aid agency, 
the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), would deny new funding to the 
Philippine government due to major concerns around rule of law and civil liberties 
in this country.97  The MCC justified that decision on the basis of aiding recipients 
includes also a demonstrated commitment to the rule of law, due process and 
respect for human rights.98 The result was that a large-scale infrastructure project 
development funding, worth up to US$434 million, to the Philippines was denied 
by MCC. Grants were awarded to Sri Lanka, Tunisia and Burkina Faso instead.99 
 From the European side, before president Duterte took his official position 
on 30 June 2016, the EU and the Philippines had a longstanding relationship 
which has broadened and deepened remarkably. In July 2012, the EU-Philippines 
partnership cooperation agreement was signed.100 The agreement provided the 
legal framework for further engagement and cooperation between the EU and the 
Philippines on areas such as political dialogue, trade, energy, transport, human 
rights, education, science and technology, justice, asylum, and migration. Since 25 
95  Christopher Woody (2016), “The Philippines’ bloody crackdown on drugs is now harming the 
country’s economy”, Business Insider Nederland, available at https://www.businessinsider.nl/rodrigo-
duterte-philippines-violence-scaring-investors-hurting-economy-2016-9/?international=true&r=US. 
(Accessed May 24, 2018).
96 Megha Rajagopalan (2016), “How US Dollars Are Helping The Philippines’ Bloody 
Drug War”, Buzz Feed News, available at https://www.buzzfeed.com/meghara/us-aid-dollars 
phillipines?utm_term=.wmJbQB884#.euM4WXyyY. (Accessed May 24, 2018).
97 Christopher Woody in supra note 95.
98 Ibid.
99 Ed Adamczyk (2016), “U.S. denies aid package to Philippines over human rights concerns”, 
UPI, available at https://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2016/12/15/US-denies-aid-package-to-
Philippines-over-human-rights-concerns/3681481820651/.  (Accessed May 24, 2018).
100 European Union External Action, “The EU-Philippines partnership cooperation agreement”, 





December 2014, under the EU’s Generalized Scheme of Preferences plus (GSP+), 
the Philippines has enjoyed boosted trade preferences with the EU which led to the 
Free Trade Agreement between both sides.101  
 After Filipino president Duterte started the harsh anti-drug campaign, 
the relationship between the EU and the Philippines deteriorated. Members of 
the European Union parliament, which include highly developed countries like 
Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, Czech Republic, Sweden, Portugal 
and Finland, called on the Philippine government to put an end to the wave of 
extrajudicial killings and executions of individuals suspected of involvement in the 
illegal drug trade.102 The European Parliament adopted resolution of 15 September 
2016 on the Philippines (2016/2880(RSP)) to condemn extrajudicial killings in the 
Philippines.103 The resolution aims to commit the Philippine president to uphold 
the rule of law and human rights, as well as international human rights treaties.
 In March 2017, Duterte faced additional pressure when Cecilia Malström, 
the visiting European Union Trade Commissioner, cautioned the Philippine 
government that human rights-abusing policies of the drug war pose a threat 
to exports to the EU.104 She indicated that unless the government took action 
to address the EU’s concerns, the Philippines risks losing tariff-free exports 
of up to 6,000 products under the EU’s human rights benchmarks linked to 
the Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP+) trade program.105 Surprisingly, 
since the EU sent a much-needed message to the Philippine government to 
forego this policy, the Philippines government did not accept such criticism and 
reacted to the EU as if they are an interferer of internal affairs. Duterte remarked 
101 European Union External Action (2016), “Philippines and the EU”, available at https://eeas.
europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/1694/philippines-and-eu_hr. (Accessed May 24, 
2018).
102 Estrella Torre (2016), “EU urges PH to stop extrajudicial killings of drug suspects”, Inquirer.
Net, available at http://globalnation.inquirer.net/145037/eu-weighs-in-on-human-rights-issue-in-
antidrug-war. (Accessed May 24, 2018).
103 The European Parliament (2016), “The European Parliament resolution of 15 September 
2016 on the Philippines (2016/2880(RSP))”, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2016-0349&language=EN. (Accessed May 24, 2018).
104  Phelim Kine (2017), “Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s ‘War on Drugs’”, Harvard 
International Review, available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/07/philippine-president-
rodrigo-dutertes-war-drugs. (Accessed May 24, 2018).
105 Ibid.
in the 31st Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit “Forget 
it. We will survive, even if we have to eat dried fish and rice, we will survive,” 
when asked if he talked to European Council President Donald Tusk about 
possible donations from the EU.106 
 Franz Jessen, the EU Ambassador to the Philippines stated that aid cuts 
from the 28-member bloc would mean the Philippines loses about €250 million 
or $278.73 million worth of grants.107 Other losses of the amounts the country 
is set to receive total €325 million (around P18.05 billion) in aid from 2014 to 
2020 under the EU’s Multi-Annual Indicative Program for the Philippines which 
was meant to be used for sustainable energy and job creation, legal and judicial 
reform, as well as feasibility studies and outreach programs.108 The aid cuts entail 
a huge financial loss to the Philippines as the country has always been awarded 
such funding. The missing amounts are bound to affect economic improvements, 
and goals which include poverty reduction and sustainable development in the 
Philippines. Duterte’s brutal war on drugs could also hit foreign investments as 
companies and investors involved are concerned about labour stability issues.  The 
number of killings during the heightened anti-drug campaign harms the country’s 
image as a stable, feasible country to do business. And it is not hard to imagine 
investors’ concern that local people might be involved in drugs or be caught in the 
cross fires, affecting the personnel and industrial chain.
 CSOs were a major part of bringing about external international pressure 
to the Philippine government. Such pressure seems to slow the president’s killings 
policy. In October 2017, Duterte ordered police to end all operations in his deadly 
war on drugs after a 15-month campaign.109 In a televised speech he said that the 
campaign war on drug will shift to “a big fish network”, moving away from street 
106 Eimor P. Santos (2017), “Duterte rejects EU aid yet again: Forget it, we will survive”, CNN 
Philippines, available at http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2017/11/15/asean-duterte-rejects-eu-aid-
again.html. (Accessed May 24, 2018).
107 Bernie Cahiles-Magkilat (2018), “PH rejected EU aid worth $55 M in 2017; Duterte invited to 
ASEM”, MANILABULLETIN, available at https://business.mb.com.ph/2018/01/25/ph-rejected-
eu-aid-worth-55-m-in-2017-duterte-invited-to-asem/. (Accessed May 24, 2018).
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level killing to suppress the suppliers instead.110 However, there are a number of 
human rights groups arguing that the killings only declined but did not stop, and 
the president only has a tactic to induce reliability. Evidence shows that between 
December 5, 2017 and February 1, 2018, there were still 46 suspected drug 
personalities killed by police officers.111 
 Therefore, it can be remarked that the impact from external pressure, 
although substantial, is not enough to stop the abusive campaign. Rather, it has 
slowed down the campaign and had tangent economic and diplomatic effects. Also, 
we found that national and regional human rights institutions could not provide 
any aid or power to stop these abuses. At the domestic level, the Commission on 
Human Rights of the Philippines (Komisyon sa Karapatang Pantao) has clashed 
with President Rodrigo Duterte over his bloody war on drugs, but, the result of 
this was detrimental to the Commission. Philippine lawmakers voted to cut the 
Commission’s annual budget for 2018, dealing a blow to the body investigating 
Duterte’s war on drugs.112 This means that the national human rights mechanism 
does not even have the power to deal with human right violations caused by the 
leader and/or government. 
 At the regional level the situation is as desperate. There has been no voice 
from the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) on 
this point. The AICHR has remained silent, never commenting on or acknowledging 
the situation. Upon review of the AICHR’ s website and annual report one can 
observe an absence of an official statement concerning the situation of human 
rights abuses in the carrying out of Duterte’s war on drug policy. Nevertheless, 
CSOs are still working to find a resolution to the abuses against suspected drugs 
personalities in the Philippines. There is another prominent strategy of CSOs in 
dealing with this matter, illustrated in the next part.
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5.3 CSOs’ Strategy in Reaching Out to an International Judicial Institution
As explained before, CSOs have tried in many ways to end human right abuses. 
In case of the CSOs’ outreach to the UNOCD and the INCB, which illustrates the 
role of CSOs as part of the boomerang dynamic, the pressure of these international 
organizations did not really generate sufficient impact to cause president Duterte 
to completely stop his anti-drug campaign. CSOs have to still search for an 
international judicial institution to deal with the killings. As observed, CSOs could 
not count on the AICHR, the only regional human rights institution which was 
supposed to deal with protecting against human rights abuses to step in and do 
all it can to end the drug war violence. Thus, the following sections is to illustrate 
why the AICHR is bypassed, why the ICC is a viable option, and finally how have 
CSOs been reaching out to the ICC in the Philippines case, and the response from 
the ICC.
5.3.1 Why the Regional Human Rights Institution—the AICHR is Being 
Bypassed by CSOs in Dealing with Human Rights Violations Occurring in 
Southeast Asia
Practically, national human rights protection systems are set to be the arena to 
address all human rights issues in the domestic level. Should national remedies 
be exhausted, there normally exists a higher platform to resort to. As can be seen 
from the European, Inter-American, and African models, their respective regional 
human rights mechanism effectively plays a vital role as the overarching human 
rights institution in each region. In contrast, in Southeast Asia there is an absence 
of such powerful mechanisms that exist in other regions. With respect to this 
case, no recourse has been sought to the only existing regional human rights 
institution— the AICHR, whose mandate does not include proactively protecting 
human rights violations.
 Two main factors can be attributed to this bypassing by CSOs. First, the 
AICHR has no judicial competency to investigate the violations, prosecute, or 
adjudicate the matter. It does not even have the legal competency to receive any 
complaints, unlike the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, for example, 




any person, group of persons, or nongovernmental entity submitted to them.113 It can 
be clearly seen that the AICHR’s Terms of Reference (TOR), the instrument which 
provides the mandates and purposes of the AICHR, does not mention any mandate 
which allows the AICHR to act on and respond to cases of human rights violations. 
 Several CSOs assert that upon the occurrence of a human rights violation, 
they would firstly think of the AICHR, but would finally they change their minds and 
bypass the role of the AICHR in helping such violations because they believe that there 
will not be an effective response from the AICHR. For example, Cristina Palabay, 
Secretary General of Philippine-based human rights organization KARAPATAN 
explained why CSOs do not realize the AICHR’s role by stating that “It is foolhardy 
to expect concrete actions and strong recommendations from the ASEAN regarding 
the human rights situation in the Philippines, when, for a long time, its human rights 
body has been rendered pointless and toothless in the protection and promotion of 
international human rights principles in the region, especially at a time of worsening 
attacks against people’s rights in South East Asia,”114
 Additionally, personal interviews with CSOs that have been accredited 
by the AICHR, namely SUARAM (Malaysia), and Pusat KOMAS (Malaysia), 
reveal that they share a similar opinion and agree that the reason that CSOs do 
not report human rights abuses in the Philippines to the AICHR is because CSOs 
are certain that it will be ignored because the AICHR itself is also aware of their 
limited capacity in dealing with CSOs’ claims, as a result of a mandate which 
does not equip it with the authority to officially receive claims and investigate 
cases, as remarked by Adli Zakuan Zairakithnaini (Programme Director of Pusat 
KOMAS).115 Dobby Chew, project coordinator of SUARAM, added that from 
communication with anonymous CSO networks in the Philippines, he found that 
CSOs did not fully bypass the AICHR, but they firstly contacted the Philippines’ 
AICHR representative to observe the possibility and opinion of the representative 
in dealing with the case, but the representative’s response is not heartening, the 
113  Article 44, American Convention on Human Rights.
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(Accessed May 24, 2018)
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representative can do nothing because the mandates have blocked the AICHR’s 
power, the AICHR cannot expand their role on this point because they need a 
consensus from all AICHR representatives, nothing more can be done, all AICHR 
representatives know that they have to work under the mandates provided, and 
importantly it will be violating the policy of non-interference which is highly 
prioritized in ASEAN.
 However, he also noted that each country’s representative has their own 
personal view and stance, and that each representative’s viewpoint affect how 
they, and ultimately the AICHR, work. Edmund Bon and Rafendi Djamin, the 
current Malaysian and former Indonesian representative respectively, themselves 
having been former heads of CSOs, for example, prioritize engagement with CSOs 
and thus advocates for AICHR in doing so. They have been sharing information 
with CSOs. Chew believes that with more AICHR representatives of a similar 
character, AICHR will be well on their way to a mandate expansion that renders 
them competent to act upon complaints of human rights violations.116
 The second factor that contributes to the CSOs bypassing the AICHR 
pertains to the AICHR’s dependence upon ASEAN member states. As it can be 
clearly seen that the AICHR’s operation is subject to its Terms of Reference (TOR) 
determined by the ASEAN’s Foreign Ministers.117 Importantly, under article 5.2 
of the TOR, Each ASEAN Member State shall appoint a Representative to the 
AICHR who shall be accountable to the appointing Government.118 Article 5.6 
provides that the government of an ASEAN member state may decide to replace 
its representative,119 and the AICHR’s budget is derived from contributions from 
ASEAN Member States.120 The AICHR representatives also rely on a consensus 
before making all agreements pursuant to article 6.1 of the TOR, and respect the 
principle of non-interference embodied in article 2 (b). These reasons are additional 
important matters contributing to why the AICHR is bypassed.
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 Remarking on this point from the AICHR representatives, Dr. Diana 
Wisnu, Indonesian representative to the AICHR, points out that because the TOR 
provides mandates that limit the representatives. She remarked that the TOR and 
the ASEAN Charter are the main conditions that constrain the representatives, 
and that they have to work under the mandates which was created by all ASEAN 
member states. The non-interference policy also blocks them from expanding their 
roles in intervening member states regarding the human rights violations that has 
happened, that is why representatives cannot take action on such violations. She 
remarks that she is aware that when the human rights violations occur, CSOs do 
not report it to the AICHR because they know that the AICHR does not have a 
mandate, it needs a consensus before action.121 Moreover, even if a consensus is 
reached, without a legal mandate it would be difficult to exercise power. 
   Edmund Bon, Malaysian AICHR representative put forward an interesting 
opinion. He remarked on the difference between human rights situations in the 
Philippines and in Myanmar, with respect to the Rohingya crisis. The AICHR did 
not receive any official requests from CSOs, human rights groups or activists with 
respect to the extrajudicial killing cases in the Philippines. CSOs, human rights 
groups and activists know that the situation is a furtherance of an explicit state 
policy. But, it has received several requests from CSOs pressuring it to address 
human rights situations in the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar. However, the AICHR 
finally was only able to make a statement to the Myanmar government but there is 
no legally binding force, again, because of the mandates.122
 Bon additionally remarked that if the AICHR needs more power, and do 
not want to be bypassed, the TOR should be firstly amended to free the AICHR 
from the non-interference principle, and be independent from ASEAN member 
states. This seems difficult but can be possible in the future if the AICHR can have 
strong supporters in terms of funding, such as by well-funded NGOs and CSOs, 
external entrepreneurs and international organizations.123  
 In sum, it can be asserted that these shortcomings greatly contribute to 
121 Wisnu Diana, (2018, April 12). Personal Interview.
122 Bon Edmund, (2018, April 12). Personal Interview.
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the reason why the AICHR is bypassed when the human rights violations occur 
in the region, thereby necessitating CSOs’ outreach to a more legally competent 
institution, in the human rights abuses on extrajudicial killing cases, the International 
Criminal Court, the topic of which will be discussed in the next section.
5.3.2 The International Criminal Court (ICC) as a viable option: A legal analysis
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is a judicially viable option for various 
reasons. First and foremost, the ICC is a permanent international judicial 
organization responsible for bringing justice in relation to heinous crimes.124 It is 
correct that CSOs have chosen the ICC to deal with the murderous war on drugs 
in the Philippines because firstly even though the ICC is not a human rights court 
in the strict sense, but it has great significance for the global protection of the 
most fundamental human rights and values as it can be argued that the heinous 
crimes under ICC jurisdiction also constitute a gross violation of human rights. 
This point is obviously explained by the aim of the ICC’s adoption which is to 
protect civilians from atrocities such as those in the Nazi regime, Yugoslavia, and 
Rwanda. In addition, the preamble of the Rome Statue is similar to that of the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights,125 reflecting their shared aims. It is thus 
easy to see the relevance of the ICC in the protection of fundamental human values.
 Secondly, in addition to the nature of the ICC being a permanent judicial 
institution whose adjudication has human rights implications, the crimes under 
ICC jurisdiction may very well apply over the Philippine war on drugs. As is 
widely known, the ICC was set up to end impunity for the most serious crimes of 
international concern, namely genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
the crime of aggression as provided in article 5 of the Rome Statute.126 As mentioned, 
all crime themselves constitute a massive violation against human rights. In the 
specific case of Duterte’s war on drugs, crimes against humanity would most 
likely be applicable. Legally speaking, the definition of a crime against humanity 
article 7 of the Rome Statute entails, in essence, an act of state or organizational 
124 Article 1, Rome Statue.
125 Hans-Peter Kaul (2011), “Human Rights and the International Criminal Court”, available 
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policy committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against 
any civilian population.127 Such acts may include murder, imprisonment, or 
other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of 
international law, and torture.128 Additionally, the acts do not necessarily have to 
occur within the context of an armed conflict, this means the acts of government 
against their civilians in peacetime may fall under the definition. As we know, the 
extrajudicial killing under Duterte’s war-on-drugs policy involves the large-scale, 
police executed, killing, torturing, and detaining of suspected drug dealers and 
users, making it amount to a crime against humanity, thereby falling under the 
jurisdiction of the ICC. However, note must be made that the ICC would establish 
individual criminal responsibility for the State leader, while a human rights court 
would declare the State in breach of its human rights obligations.
 Thirdly, the ICC is an ideal arena for CSOs to pursue their claims because 
the case of extrajudicial killings at hand can actually be submitted and considered 
by the ICC by virtue of the Philippines’ status as a member state, having ratified 
the Rome Statue. Since the ICC was formally established on the 1st of July, 2002, 
the Statute had to be ratified by at least 60 States before entering into force.129 
On 30 August 2011, at the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs in New York, 
the government of the Republic of the Philippines deposited its instrument of 
ratification to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),130 
making it 117th country to have joined the Rome Statute system.131 After becoming 
a state party, states submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court. Thus, the 
Court may exercise its jurisdiction in situations where the alleged perpetrator is 
a national of a State Party or where the crime was committed in the territory of a 
State Party.132 Unquestionably, the Philippines has to be subject to the Rome Statue 
127 Article 7, Rome Statue.
128 Ibid.
129 Coalition for the International Criminal Court, “Ratification of the Rome Statue”, available at 
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releases%202011/Pages/pr717.aspx. (Accessed May 24, 2018).
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132 The International Criminal Court, “Understanding the International Criminal Court”, available 
at https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/pids/publications/uicceng.pdf. (Accessed May 24, 2018).
and the procedure of the ICC as a member state party, pursuant to articles 11 and 
12 paragraph 1 of the Rome Statute; “If a State becomes a Party to this Statute 
after its entry into force, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction only with respect 
to crimes committed after the entry into force of this Statute for that State,…”.133 
This third reason seems to most strongly support the assertion as to why CSOs 
have chosen this institution to bring justice to the victims of this case, because they 
would think that at least the ICC is the only powerful judicial institution whose 
jurisdiction the Philippines is subject to, and which may help to break the cycle of 
violence of Duterte’s policy. 
 Having said that, attention should be brought to the fact that the Philippines 
has recently expressed its intention to withdraw its state membership from the 
Rome Statute. On 17 March 2018, the Republic of the Philippines deposited a 
written notification of withdrawal from the Rome Statute to the United Nations 
Secretary General.134 Pursuant to paragraph 1 of article 127, the withdrawal will 
take effect one year after the date of receipt of the notification.135
 In light of the Philippines’ withdrawal from the Rome Statute, a question 
comes to mind as to what effect such withdrawal has on the ICC’s jurisdiction 
over the Philippines. Article 127 paragraph 2 stipulates that “A State shall not be 
discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the obligations arising from this 
Statute while it was a Party to the Statute.”136 In particular, a State’s withdrawal 
does not in any way prejudice “the continued consideration of any matter which 
was already under consideration by the Court prior to the date on which the 
withdrawal became effective.”137 Therefore, acts committed while the Philippines 
was a member of the Rome Statute can still be considered by the ICC, despite the 
Philippines’ withdrawal becoming effective later.
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 The fourth reason that the ICC is the targeted institution is because it 
accepts claims from individuals or CSOs. Although the Rome Statue and the 
ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence do not provide a specific category on who 
can exactly submit information on alleged crimes to the Office of the Prosecutor 
(OTP) of the ICC. Article 13(a) of the Rome Statute provides that crimes can be 
brought to the Court by referral of a case to the Prosecutor.138 Accordingly, article 
14 paragraphs 1 and 2 further explains that a State Party can make a referral 
which specifies the relevant circumstances and is accompanied by supporting 
documents, then the Prosecutor will consider investigating the situation for 
the purpose of determining whether one or more specific persons should be 
charged.139 These two articles only explicitly specify that a State Party can refer 
a case to the Prosecutor. There is no article which clearly states that individuals 
or groups can refer a case to the Court.
 There is, however, article 15 paragraph 1 which states that the Prosecutor 
can initiate an investigation proprio motu on the basis of information on 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, and mentions non-governmental 
organizations by stating that the Prosecutor may seek additional information 
from non-governmental organizations and other reliable sources that he or 
she deems appropriate.140 This seems to suggest that NGOs and/or CSOs 
can inform the Office of the Prosecutor about crimes committed and the 
historical and political context of human rights abuses.141  This information 
could also help the Prosecutor have a better understanding of a situation and 
decide whether or not to open an investigation.142 This mechanism opens a 
possibility for CSOs to be capable of providing valuable assistance to the 
ICC’s Prosecutor. Human rights crimes that may fall under the jurisdiction 
of the ICC can regularly be reported to the Prosecutor by CSOs. In addition, 
they can provide evidence to the Office of the Prosecutor by accompanying 
138 Article 13, Rome Statue.
139 Article 14 paragraphs 1 and 2, Rome Statue.
140  Article 15 paragraph 1, Rome Statue.
141 Human Rights Watch (2004), “The International Criminal Court: How Nongovernmental 
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victims and witnesses because CSOs are often close to such people.143 
 Evidences here guarantee there is a significant role for CSOs to occupy 
within the international criminal justice system of the ICC, particularly by 
submitting, reporting and providing information on cases to the ICC.144 Past 
events have also shown how CSOs have made use of this informant role to help 
cases of human rights abuse be under the attention of the Prosecutor. In Ituri, 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA) committed grave crimes against Ugandan civilians in northern Uganda 
from 2002 to 2005. Human Rights Watch published a 66-page report on the 
situation in Congo. The report was addressed also to the Prosecutor and urged the 
Prosecutor to open investigations into the crimes committed.145 The Prosecutor 
later identified the situation in Ituri as “the most urgent situation to be followed”146 
and an investigation was subsequently opened with respect to the crimes allegedly 
committed there.147 Another case that comes to mind is the case of the Honduran 
military coup in 2009, in which hundreds of people, including journalists, 
trade unionists, land activists, and human rights lawyers, have been killed or 
disappeared.148 CSOs, namely, the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) and 
the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), made a submission, and 
collected evidences showing there has been no accountability so far for the crimes 
143  Human Rights First (2004), “The Role of Human Rights NGOs in Relation to ICC 
Investigations”, available at https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/NGO_
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to the International Criminal Court.149  In light of this Article 15 communication, 
the Prosecutor subsequently opened a preliminary examination into the situation.150 
5.3.3 Bringing the Murderous War on Drugs to the ICC: An Illustration
In the preceding part we examined why the ICC is an attractive choice for 
Philippine CSOs to reach out to. For this part, we delve further into an illustration 
of the manner by which CSOs are bringing the case of the murderous war on drugs 
in the Philippines to the ICC. 
 On 24 April 2017, Jude Josue Sabio, lawyer of self-confessed hitman Edgar 
Matobato, submitted a 77-page communication to Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda 
of the International Criminal Court (ICC).151 His aim is to charge Philippine 
President Rodrigo Duterte and 11 of his senior officials of having committed mass 
murders or extra-judicial executions which constitute crime against humanity.152 
He remarked: “My purpose is not to destroy him (the President), embarrass him, 
or shame him. My purpose is to fight for justice”.153  
 Various CSOs rallied their efforts in support of ICC preliminary examination 
into Duterte’s war on drug campaign. Perhaps the most notable of these efforts 
comes from Loretta Ann P. Rosales. On 26 April 2017, Rosales, a founding 
member of the ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) and former 
Chairperson of the Southeast Asia National Human Rights Institutions Forum, 
issued a statement on the complaint against Duterte. In addition to asserting that 
the move is an important step towards strengthening the rule of law, interestingly, 
she gave historical insight into the Philippines’ relationship with the ICC, pointing 
out how “The Philippines ratified this treaty [The Rome Statute] in 2011 through 
149 Centre for Constitutional Rights (2012), “NGOs Submit Evidence to ICC on Crimes Against 
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the skillful advocacy of civil society organizations.”154 This remark can be taken 
to emphasize the symbiotic relationship between the Court and the country in the 
pursuit of justice and the fight against impunity. She observed that this filing will 
require significant investment of the ICC’s time and resources in order to gather 
the sufficient evidence necessary to bring the charges forward, hold a trial, convict 
and punish the concerned persons.155
 Another notable effort came in the form of a coalition of CSOs. In December 
2017, 93 CSOs including APCASO (Thailand), Filipino American Human Rights 
Alliance (FAHRA), Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates, Philippine 
Human Rights Information Center, Asia Catalyst and Asian Network of People 
Who Use Drugs (ANPUD), and worldwide allies signed an open letter addressed to 
ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda. After providing a background into the situation, 
four issues are mentioned in the letter; why the ICC has jurisdiction, why the case 
is admissible, how the extrajudicial killings amount to a crime against humanity, 
and why the information provided in the letter by the CSOs constitute a reasonable 
basis that a crime is being committed. The letter’s main purpose was to urge the 
Prosecutor to open an investigation into alleged crimes against humanity against 
Duterte.156
 Moreover, Amnesty International called for the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) to begin a preliminary examination into the crimes against humanity.157 
James Gomez, Amnesty International’s Regional Director for Southeast Asia and 
the Pacific added that “It is time for international justice mechanisms to step in 
and end the carnage on Philippine streets by bringing the perpetrators to justice. 
The country’s judiciary and police have proven themselves both unwilling and 
unable to hold the killers in the ‘war on drugs’ to account”.158
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 All the above forms the communications and reports from which the 
Prosecutor takes account of in determining whether to initiate examinations. On 
Thursday, February 8, 2018, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda issued a statement 
on opening preliminary examinations into the situation in the Philippines. She 
states that “following a careful, independent and impartial review of a number 
of communications and reports documenting alleged crimes potentially falling 
within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court […] I have decided to 
open a preliminary examination into” the situation in the Philippines.159
 Not only have CSOs played an important role in a preliminary examination 
being opened by the ICC against the Philippines, Prosecutor Bensouda seems to 
hint at their continued role throughout the examinations. In the same statement, she 
remarked that “In the independent and impartial exercise of its mandate, my Office 
will also give consideration to all submissions and views conveyed to it during the 
course of each preliminary examination, strictly guided by the requirements of the 
Rome Statute.160
6. Conclusion and Recommendations
Civil society organizations (CSOs) are increasingly being recognized as 
indispensable for the effective functioning of human rights protection around 
the world. In Southeast Asia, CSOs are a key actor in helping to promote and 
protect human rights in the region. In the recent situation of the murderous war 
on drugs in the Philippines which allegedly involve the extrajudicial killing of 
drug dealers and users and which took place since President Rodrigo Duterte’s 
taking of office in 2016, CSOs’ have demonstrated their competency in helping 
to end the human rights violations involved. In application with the boomerang 
model, we can observe that when CSOs become aware of situations of human 
rights abuse, they begin to collaborate with their domestic peers to put pressure on 
the government. They request the government and governmental departments to 
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take serious responsibility in the cases which are attributable to their conduct and 
which impacts the rights of the people. This is the primary step of CSOs in urging 
the violating state to be accountable for the abuse of power of those in authority 
and to ensure justice for all civilians.
 However, when the requests of national CSOs were ignored by the 
government, this prompts the adoption of a subsequent regional and international 
strategy—proceeding to reach out to regional CSOs to work together and reach 
out to international CSOs. Finally, international CSOs pressure international 
organizations who then put pressure back against the norm-violating state. Thus, it 
can be summarized that CSOs acted as agents of the boomerang dynamic to diffuse 
information of the human rights violations involved in the anti-drug campaign. It 
is evident that their strategy effects the norm violating state—the Philippines—in 
terms of economic loss and diplomatic relations. 
 Yet, this strategy has not really caused president Duterte to completely 
stop his extrajudicial killing policy. However, as a key actor in helping end human 
rights abuses, CSOs still endeavored to interact with international institutions so as 
to bring justice to victims of Duterte‘s war on drugs. They rallied efforts to reach 
out to a powerful judicial institution, the International Criminal Court (ICC), by 
submitting reports on the extrajudicial killings to the court, giving insight into the 
context and extent of the violations, finally leading to a preliminary examination 
being opened by the ICC’s prosecutor into the situation. All strategies of CSOs 
demonstrate that their performances pertain to human rights norm diffusion in 
terms of diffusion of information and directly effectuating a direct legal response 
that would end human rights violations.
 Thus, it can be guaranteed that CSOs are an important actor in helping 
to end human rights violations. All impacts from CSOs working against the 
extrajudicial killing case in the Philippines show that the effectiveness of 
ending human rights violation can come from the CSO sector. Indeed, CSOs’ 
strategies also might ignite ASEAN to rethink creating an effective regional 
human rights institution soon, so that ASEAN can have an effective regional 
human rights institution like other regions to deal with human rights violations, 
especially those that might occur in the future, as the region’s existing human 
